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ABSTRACT  
The political fault lines surrounding the European sovereign debt crisis have underlined 
the political relevance and the fragile foundation of public support for international 
redistribution in the European Union. Against the backdrop of an emerging political 
integration-demarcation divide, this article examines how cosmopolitanism structures 
people’s willingness to redistribute internationally within the European Union. To this 
aim, we conducted laboratory experiments on redistributive behaviour towards other 
European citizens in the United Kingdom and Germany and analysed cross-national 
survey data on support for international redistribution covering the EU-28. Our findings 
suggest that cosmopolitanism increases generosity towards other Europeans and support 
for international redistribution even when controlling for self-interest, support for 
national redistribution, concern for others, and political ideology. 
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Introduction 
The European sovereign debt crisis has underlined the political relevance and the fragile 
foundation of public support for international redistribution in the European Union 
(EU). Amid unprecedented economic downturn, several member states have received 
financial assistance from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund 
(European Commission 2014). European policy makers are currently pushing for further 
social integration and risk sharing, as highlighted in the Five Presidents’ Report 
(European Commission 2015). 
However, international redistribution is highly contentious, and sceptical public opinion 
makes it difficult to legitimize such actions (Hobolt 2015). Citizens do not necessarily 
adapt their allegiances to the transnationalization of society. Globalization also triggers 
counter-reactions such as ethnocentrism and parochialism. West European democracies 
are witnessing the emergence of a new political divide that pits the proponents of 
globalization against its opponents (Hooghe and Marks 2017; Kriesi et al. 2008). The 
most salient issues of this conflict are immigration and European integration, and they 
are predominantly discussed in cultural rather than economic terms (Hooghe and Marks 
2017; Teney et al. 2014; Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009). Teney and colleagues (2014) 
show that this conflict is related to cosmopolitan and communitarian ideological 
dispositions. While cosmopolitans favour opening national boundaries and welcome 
immigration and European integration, communitarians oppose these developments.  
It is less clear whether openness towards immigration and European integration 
is mere lip service or translates into support for international redistribution, especially as 
much of the current debate focuses on cultural rather than economic aspects. Moreover, 
while cosmopolitanism entails more open and global orientations, this may not translate 
into support for redistribution either at home or abroad. Cosmopolitans might be simply 
too elitist, mobile, and detached from society to care for ‘ordinary’ people in need 
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(Calhoun 2002; Ciornei and Recchi 2017; Delhey et al. 2015). It is therefore not obvious 
that cosmopolitanism indeed breeds international solidarity within the European Union. 
We ask the following question: Are cosmopolitan individuals willing to practice 
what they preach and share resources with other Europeans? We analyse how 
cosmopolitanism structures people’s willingness to redistribute within the European 
Union using laboratory experiments in the United Kingdom and Germany and survey 
data from 28 EU member states (European Election Study, EES, 2014, see Schmitt et al. 
(2015)). By studying redistributive behaviour in the laboratory and preferences in a larger 
sample, we aim at maximizing both internal and external validity of our findings. 
 Our laboratory evidence suggests that while cosmopolitans do not discriminate 
between national and European recipients of redistribution, citizens with less 
cosmopolitan values give significantly less to European recipients compared to fellow 
nationals. Also in absolute terms, cosmopolitans give more to European recipients. Our 
cross-national analyses of EES underscore the external validity of these results: Across 
the EU, cosmopolitanism is strongly associated with support for international 
redistribution, even after controlling for self-interest, support for national redistribution, 
political ideology, and other relevant covariates. 
This study contributes to the debate about support for international 
redistribution in the EU (Bechtel et al. 2014; Ciornei and Recchi 2017; Stoeckel and 
Kuhn 2017) and to research on public support for European integration (for an overview 
see Hobolt and de Vries 2016). By studying how support for redistribution depends on 
the recipient’s nationality, it also speaks to research on welfare chauvinism (Mewes and 
Mau 2013; Van der Waal et al. 2010). Our results have important implications for current 
policy debates, as highlighted in the controversy surrounding bailouts for countries like 
Greece. Public opinion plays an increasingly important role in shaping policy responses 
to the sovereign debt crisis (Copelovitch et al. 2016: 832).  
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What drives support for international redistribution in the European 
Union? 
Research on national redistribution has emphasized the role of self-interest in structuring 
public opinion (Iversen and Soskice 2001). The central idea is that individuals support 
redistribution if they expect to benefit from it. Research finds little evidence in support 
of economic self-interest as a driver of support for international redistributioni. Bechtel 
and colleagues (2014), for example, develop three mechanisms through which economic 
self-interest could structure support for international bailouts, but don’t find any little 
empirical support for their expectations. While welfare chauvinism, the preference of 
excluding foreigners from welfare benefits, is more pervasive among citizens with lower 
levels of education, Van der Waal and colleagues (2010) conclude that this is due to 
lower cultural capital rather than weaker economic positions of lower educated people. 
Partisanship and political ideology also play a role. Bechtel and colleagues (2014) 
find that voters of German mainstream parties are more supportive of international 
bailouts, while an experiment by Stoeckel and Kuhn (2017) shows that voters more 
generally follow party cues. A recent study finds that left-leaning individuals with higher 
socio-economic status are more supportive of international bailouts those on the right, 
whereas left-leaning citizens with low socio-economic status are opposed to international 
bailouts (Kleider and Stoeckel 2016). 
Altruism, generally understood as a preference to increase the welfare of others 
even if this implies a personal loss, might be an alternative motivation for support for 
(international) redistribution. Fong (2007) shows that altruism drives charitable giving to 
welfare recipients in the US, and Bechtel and colleagues (2014) demonstrate that more 
altruistic Europeans are more supportive of international economic bailouts. 
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 Bernhard and colleagues (2006) have made the insightful observation, however, 
that many people are ‘parochially altruistic’, that is to say they behave altruistically 
towards their in-group, but less so towards their out-group. Shayo (2009) shows that 
competing group identifications influence support for redistribution. Group identity 
come in many guises such as race, nation, language, gender, or organizational and 
political affiliations, and which identification is most salient is likely context-dependent 
(Roccas et al. 2008; Shayo 2009).  
 The most relevant group boundary in the European context is the nation. Most 
citizens view their national community as the predominant reference-point for social 
solidarity (Whelan and Maître 2009). This is partly due to nation states having long been 
the main welfare providers and influencing people’s understanding of who should be in 
or out. Research on welfare chauvinism shows that some Europeans hold generally 
egalitarian values, but nonetheless think that foreigners should be excluded from welfare-
state provisions (Mewes and Mau 2013). It is therefore possible that Europeans who are 
generally altruistic do not extend this altruism towards citizens of other countries. They 
might be concerned for fellow nationals, and might favour equality within their own 
national community, but not beyond.  
More ‘cosmopolitan’ individuals are most likely to overcome these national 
boundaries of solidarity and do not discriminate against people from other EU member 
states. Cosmopolitanism has an institutional and a moral-psychological dimension (Zürn 
2016). With respect to the latter, Merton (1968) describes cosmopolitans as individuals 
with a more open, global orientation and higher interest in, and awareness of, distant 
events, as opposed to ‘locals’ who have an inward looking perspective. Following 
Vertovec and Cohen (2002), a cosmopolitan orientation means seeing oneself as citizen 
of the world and appreciating other human beings irrespective of their national origin. 
Institutional cosmopolitanism entails the legitimization of supranational authority and 
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the awareness of the increased interconnectedness of political communities (Held 2002: 
58).  
Cosmopolitan orientations and institutions do not necessarily have a global scope 
(for a recent review, see Zürn 2016). In Europe, European integration is an important 
reference category for cosmopolitanism. In institutional terms, Archibugi (1998: 215-19) 
sees the EU as the first cosmopolitan model of democracy. In psychological terms, 
European identity and a positive evaluation of European integration clearly entail a 
cosmopolitan dimension: By supporting European integration, voters legitimize a 
supranational polity and accept increased interaction and interdependence with other 
European countries (Risse 2010: 61).ii 
Research suggests that cosmopolitanism is indeed linked to international 
solidarity. Buchan and colleagues (2009) demonstrate in multilevel sequential cooperation 
experiments that people holding stronger cosmopolitan attitudes are more likely to 
cooperate internationally. Paxton and Knack (2012) show that individuals who see 
themselves as members of the world are more supportive of foreign aid. 
Cosmopolitanism has also been shown to be the main driver of support for international 
bailouts among Germans (Bechtel et al. 2014). On the basis of these insights, we 
formulate the hypothesis: 
H1: Individuals with cosmopolitan values are less likely to discriminate against 
redistribution recipients from other EU member states. 
 
Critics maintain that cosmopolitans may be open and global, but not necessarily 
solidarious towards others, be it from their own country or from abroad. From this 
perspective, cosmopolitan individuals tend to belong to a privileged group of ‘frequent 
travellers’ that are increasingly detached from their surroundings, subscribe to neoliberal 
ideas, and even consciously aim at distinguishing themselves from society at large 
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(Calhoun 2002; Sklair 2001). Calhoun (2002) argues that cosmopolitanism has mainly 
been an elite concept that embraces economistic ideals, and that its understanding of 
belonging and social life is too thin and superficial to provide a basis for social solidarity. 
Delhey and colleagues (2015) argue that with growing economic prosperity, a 
transnational lifestyle becomes a form of social class distinction. Cosmopolitans might 
support open borders and common humanity, but still be very reluctant to share their 
resources with people in need. As Calhoun (2002: 106) puts it, ‘[i]f there is to be a major 
redistribution of wealth […] it is not likely to be guided by cosmopolitanism’. Hence, we 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
H2: While not discriminating against foreigners, cosmopolitans are less generous 
towards redistribution recipients than individuals with more national orientations.  
 
Measuring willingness to redistribute internationally 
Capturing people’s willingness to redistribute internationally in empirical research is not 
straightforward. Considering that individuals generally tend to see and present 
themselves as more generous than they really are, analyses of public opinion surveys 
might suffer from social desirability bias (Cram and Patrikios 2015). Hence, an large body 
of research in experimental economics following the footsteps of Kahneman and 
colleagues (1986) relies on laboratory experiments to analyse which factors influence 
individuals’ sharing behavior. By studying actual behavior rather than stated preferences, 
laboratory experiments reduce the risk of social desirability bias. Moreover, random 
assignment to different treatments, a highly homogenous participant pool, and a 
controlled environment increase internal validity by isolating the causal relationships. 
This comes, however, at the potential loss of external validity: It is not clear whether the 
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relationships found in the laboratory extend beyond this context and generally apply to a 
more heterogeneous population.  
Hence, we combine laboratory experiments in Germany and the United 
Kingdom with cross-national survey data of the EES (Schmitt et al. 2015) on preferences 
for international redistribution. This enables us to see whether the redistributive behavior 
in the laboratory – involving real costs – also holds in a more representative sample 
across the EU.  
 
 
Laboratory experiment 
We conducted laboratory experiments in four locations in Germany and the United 
Kingdom. These experiments were conducted in April and May 2013 in the midst of one 
of the deepest crises of the EU when questions of intra-EU solidarity and perceptions of 
national stereotypes were part-and-parcel of the media debate. This background lends 
our laboratory experiments more credibility and highlights the importance of measuring 
people’s willingness to redistribute in a more stylized way which is less prone to social 
desirability compared to survey responses. The experiments were designed to capture 
people’s redistributive behaviour, and how this varies for national and international 
recipients. Hence, the experiments had to involve citizens from different countries and 
take place in different EU member states. Participants were linked to each other across 
locations. Only by doing so, can we analyse people’s redistributive behaviour across 
countries without deceiving experimental participants. The experiments took place in 
experimental laboratories in four locations: Oxford (n=63), Edinburgh (n=43), Munich 
(n=43) and Berlin (n=68) using the software z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). We opted for 
Germany and the United Kingdom because they differ with respect to public opinion 
towards European integration. 
 9 
Experimental participants were recruited by the laboratories from a university 
student population. Only German and UK citizens were allowed to participate in the 
German and UK locations, respectively. Participants received an initial show-up fee and 
could keep the pay-offs they had earned in the games. On average, participants earned 
20€ in Germany and 19£ in the United Kingdom. Table A1 (appendix) shows the 
descriptive statistics. Not surprisingly for a university student sample, the mean and 
standard deviation of participants’ age is low.iii It is well documented that university 
students are very pro-EU, both due to their young age and their high level of education, 
which are important predictors of EU support (Hakhverdian et al. 2013; Kuhn 2012). 
Citizens with higher levels of education are also less opposed to immigration (Lancee and 
Sarrasin 2015). This arguably stacks the odds against finding significant differences 
among a relatively homogenous group of participants.  
The experiments capture redistributive behaviour using so-called Dictator Games, 
but enriched with a design that reflects the multi-level politics in the EU. The first use of 
dictator games is attributed to Kahneman and colleagues (1986), and this strand of 
research has become standard in behavioural economics. Dictator games and similar 
decision games have also become increasingly popular among researchers interested in 
political behaviour (Landa and Duell 2015).  
Each participant was confronted with three decisions. In each decision, 
participants received an initial endowment to be paid out in cash at the end of the 
experiment. Participants decided whether to keep it or to allocate it to another 
anonymous and randomly chosen recipient. Participants received different informational 
cues about where the recipient was located: Either the same town, the same country or 
another EU member state.iv The order of the decisions was randomized. The amount a 
donor sent to a recipient captures their redistributive behaviour. Each participant’s 
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payoff depended on their own decisions and on other participants’ decision.v Participants 
were not informed about the decisions taken by their peers, nor did they know whom 
they were matched with. Following ethical standards in behavioural economics, all 
information given to participants was accurate. At the end, participants answered a short 
questionnaire. 
Operationalizations 
The unit of analysis refers to individual decisions. Decisions referred to redistributing 
locally, nationally, or internationally. We present pooled analyses of decisions nested in 
participants (using a random effects model to account for the within-participant 
clustering of observations).  
Table B1 (appendix) presents all operationalizations. Our dependent variable is 
measured through the number of tokens contributed per decision. As key independent 
variables, we use four measures to operationalize cosmopolitanism. First, participants 
were asked to indicate on a 0-to-10 scale to what extent they care about the living 
conditions of people in their city, people in their country, people in Europe and 
humankind. We constructed a cosmopolitanism scale by subtracting the (average) 
indicated concern for the well-being of people in one’s city and country from the 
(average) concern for people outside the country, namely people in Europe and human 
kind in general.vi Higher scores signify more cosmopolitan attitudes. 
Next, as attitudes towards immigration and the EU have been identified as the 
main issues of the cosmopolitan dimension in Europe (Van der Brug and Van Spanje 
2009), we use disagreement with the general statement that ‘Right now [country] is taking 
too many immigrants’ on a 0-to-10 scale (with higher scores indicating support for 
immigration) as an indicator of cosmopolitanism. As a third indicator of cosmopolitan 
attitudes, we include general EU-support, which is measured as evaluations of one’s 
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country’s EU membership as good, bad, or neither good nor bad. Finally, cosmopolitan 
attitudes measured through respondents’ feelings of European identity, namely ‘Do you 
see yourself as [country national] only/[country national] and European/European and 
[country national]/European only?’ While membership support relates to the EU, 
European identity can entail orientations towards Europe as a continent and ethno-
cultural community. Moreover, as collective identities are not easily malleable, this 
measure is likely to be more robust to short-term changes in performance and output of 
European institutions than EU membership support (Kuhn 2015).  
We control for political ideology, with an 11-point scale of self-placement on a left-
right dimension to account for ideology. Given that in many member states citizens at 
the extremes of the left-right dimension are most Eurosceptic (Van Elsas and Van der 
Brug 2015), we also include a squared term. According to economic self-interest 
explanations, individuals with lower socio-economic status should be less willing to 
redistribute. Consequently, we refer to participants’ self-reported class statusvii, ranging 
from working class to upper class. Support for national redistribution is measured as follows: 
‘Please indicate to what degree you personally agree with the following statements: Right 
now, differences in incomes are too large in [country]’. Answer categories range from 
absolutely disagree (0) to absolutely agree (10). Concern for others (a measure of altruism) is 
captured through a scale combining two questions relating to how concerned 
respondents are about different groups of people. All models control for gender.  
 
Results 
We analyse the impact of cosmopolitanism on redistributive behaviour within the EU in 
two ways. First, we look at generosity towards European recipients in comparison to 
national recipients, in other words, discrimination of European recipients, and whether 
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cosmopolitans discriminate less (H1). Next, it could be that cosmopolitans do not 
discriminate, but give equally little to both national and European recipients (H2). We 
therefore also analyse the absolute generosity towards European recipients.  
In the first set of analyses, we use the total amount contributed per decision as a 
dependent variable. The independent variable is whether the contributions go to a local, 
national, or European participant. Contributing less to Europeans compared to nationals 
is interpreted as evidence for discrimination against European recipients (H1).  
Model 0 in Table 1 presents the direct effect of a European recipient cue versus a 
national recipient cue on the amount contributed, and is insignificant. This means that on 
average participants do not differentiate between giving to someone from their own 
country versus from another European member state. However, this does not mean that 
the origin of the recipient is irrelevant. As shown below, some people give more if they 
know that the recipient is in another member state. Contributions to local recipients are 
significantly higher than national contributions. This indicates that participants take the 
origin of the recipient into account and underscores the power of local ties. 
Models 1-4 (Table 1) introduce interaction terms to test our hypothesis that more 
cosmopolitan participants are more generous towards other Europeans. The dummy 
‘European recipient’ is interacted with our four measures of cosmopolitanism. For our 
hypothesis to be supported, we should see significant interaction terms for all measures 
of cosmopolitanism. This is indeed what we find.  
 [Table 1 about here] 
The effects of cosmopolitanism and European recipient cue are visualized in figure 1. In 
the left panel, we see that participants scoring low on the cosmopolitanism scale give 
significantly less to European recipients compared to co-nationals, while cosmopolitans 
tend to give somewhat more to European recipients. It is noteworthy that the majority of 
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participants have a medium score of cosmopolitanism and do not discriminate either 
way. Participants who oppose immigration to their country give significantly less to a 
European recipient compared to a national recipient, while participants in favour of 
immigration do not discriminate in their contributions (right panel). 
If we look at the interaction terms of cosmopolitanism with the local recipient cue 
(Table 1), only the interaction term with EU membership support is significant. This 
indicates that cosmopolitanism matters for the distinction between national versus 
European recipients, but not for national versus local recipients. This supports our 
general argument that the greatest obstacle to solidarity is the national border. This being 
said, the finding that people in favour of EU membership give significantly more to 
locals than to nationals suggests that they are ‘rooted cosmopolitans’ who have both 
‘roots’ and ‘wings’, as Beck (2002: 19) put it, rather than opposing the global to the local. 
We did not find any significant direct effects of the control variables, except for 
class, which runs in the opposite direction than expected: Participants placing themselves 
in a higher class give significantly less per decision. We interacted the origin cues with 
support for national redistribution, concern for others, social class, and political ideology 
(Table C1, appendix). This failed to yield any significant results.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
While our findings suggest that cosmopolitans do not discriminate against 
Europeans, we cannot rule out that cosmopolitans are overall less generous than people 
with less cosmopolitan outlooks (H2). Cosmopolitans are often portrayed as too 
detached to care for others (Calhoun 2002). We further analyse our data by looking at 
contributions to European recipients only (Table 2). This reduces the number of 
observations to roughly a third, which makes it more difficult to detect significant 
relationships. All four measures of cosmopolitanism significantly increase contributions 
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to European recipients. Hence, those who display higher levels of support for the EU 
and immigration not only fail to discriminate between European and national recipients, 
they are also more generous to European recipients in absolute terms compared to other 
donors.   
[Table 2 about here] 
Our results suggest that reported cosmopolitanism is indeed more than lip 
service: It translates into real behaviour and renders people more willing to decrease their 
material welfare for the sake of other Europeans. 
As a robustness check, we included dummy variables for each experimental 
location to capture potential contextual effects (Table C2 in the appendix). While 
participants in Oxford contributed significantly less in some decisions, and contributions 
in Edinburgh and Berlin were significantly higher, these differences do not substantively 
change the individual effects. 
 
Survey 
To enhance generalizability, we harness the EES 2014 (Schmitt et al. 2015) conducted in 
all 28 EU member states. It includes a question on financial aid to other EU member 
states in economic difficulties. It is therefore highly suitable to further analyse whether 
the patterns found in the laboratory also hold for the entire European population.  
 
Variables 
The following question serves as dependent variable: ‘In times of crisis, it is desirable for 
[our country] to give financial help to another EU Member State facing severe economic 
and financial difficulties’. A 4-point scale is used to distinguish between strong and 
moderate (dis)agreement. Four per cent of the respondents opted for the ‘don’t know’ 
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option, and were removed from the analysis. This item measures redistribution from one 
member state to the other in the context of a crisis, while the experiment referred to 
individual redistributive behaviour towards other individuals. We are not aware of any 
cross-national survey that includes an item that is closer to our experimental dependent 
variable. Any difference in the wording of the dependent variables should decrease the 
probability of obtaining the same findings across data sources.  
Three items operationalize cosmopolitanism: Attitudes towards immigration are 
measured by support for restrictive immigration policy. On an 11-point scale, answer 
categories range from ‘fully in favour of restrictive policy on immigration’ (0) to ‘fully 
opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration’ (10). While this operationalization is not 
exactly the same as in the experiment, both measures capture attitudes towards how the 
state should deal with immigration. General EU-support is measured by the EU 
membership support question (same wording as in experiment). European identity is 
measured by agreement with the statement that ‘You feel attached to Europe’ (from ‘not 
at all’ to ‘yes, definitely’, 1-4). 
Turning to the control variables, support for national redistribution of wealth is 
measured on an 11-point scale ranging from fully opposed (0) to fully in favour of 
redistribution from the rich to the poor in [country] (10). The EES provides information 
on educational attainment by the age at which a respondent finished full-time education. 
The three categories, 15 or younger, 16-19, and 20 and older, roughly capture the step 
from mandatory education to secondary education and to higher education. The measure 
is not ideal, but widely used in cross-national survey research. To measure social class, 
respondents are asked to locate themselves on an 11-point scale, where 0 corresponds to 
the lowest and 10 to the highest level in society. The EES does not provide any measures 
of income. Political ideology is measured using the same 11-point left-right scale as in the 
laboratory experiment, and a squared term is included to account for higher 
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euroscepticism at the extremes. Additionally, the models control for age and gender. At the 
country level, we include a control variable for GDP per capita in 2013 and for Eurozone 
membership. Table A2 (appendix) displays a descriptive overview.viii 
The dependent variable is ordinal and we therefore use ordered logistic 
regression analysis. To account for the clustered structure (individuals nested in 
countries), we estimate multilevel models with a random intercept at the country level.ix 
We standardized the political attitude scales to better compare effect sizes.  
 
Results 
Table 3 presents the full multivariate model. We included a stepwise build-up of the 
models in the appendix (Table E1). Each of the variables used to test our hypothesis has 
a significant correlation in the expected (positive) direction. The more citizens favour 
immigration (b=.30), feel attached to Europe (b=.35) and support EU membership 
(b=.44), the more they favour international redistribution in the EU. As shown in 
appendix E, the coefficient of these variables remains strong and significant in all model 
specifications (Table E1). This suggests that similar relationships exist across the 
European population as found in the experiments. 
Interestingly, support for national redistribution is not significantly related to 
support for international redistribution. The coefficients of the socio-structural control 
variables are in line with previous studies. Confirming existing research (Hakhverdian et 
al. 2013), citizens with higher education are significantly more in favour of international 
redistribution (b= -.12 for lower educated and b=.22 for higher educated), and the same 
applies to those with a higher (perceived) social class (b=.06). Men are more supportive 
of international redistribution (b=.12). Right-wing citizens are significantly less solidary 
across borders than left-wing citizens (b= -.10). The squared term is insignificant. 
Support for international redistribution is higher in countries with a higher GDP per 
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capita. A possible interpretation is that citizens of less affluent EU member states feel 
that their country is less capable of aiding other countries. Eurozone member countries 
demonstrate clearly lower support for international redistribution. This relationship 
appears only when we control for GDP, indicating that when comparing two equally 
affluent EU member states, the one that is Eurozone member is less supportive of 
international redistribution.  
Tables E2a and E2b present the model estimations for each country separately 
and show that cosmopolitanism is the principal and most consistent predictor of 
international solidarity in each country.      
[Table 3 about here] 
Figure 2 graphically displays the effects of immigration attitudes for all four categories of 
the dependent variable. This gives a sense of the effect sizes. Going from least to most in 
favour of immigration restriction, the predicted probability to fully agree with international 
redistribution to other EU member states increases from .08 to .21. A similar increase 
occurs for the likelihood of tending to agree. As we would expect, the inverse 
relationship exists for the lower two categories of the dependent variable: as support for 
immigration decreases, people become more likely to oppose international redistribution. 
On average, predicted probabilities change with .13 when immigration support increases 
from its minimum to its maximum.  
 [Figure 2 about here] 
 
Discussion and outlook 
Against the backdrop of the European sovereign debt crisis and the turmoil surrounding 
financial bailouts of some member states, this study examines to what extent 
cosmopolitanism shapes international solidarity in the EU. Are European citizens that 
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subscribe to cosmopolitan attitudes practicing what they preach, and willing redistribute 
within the EU?  
By complementing laboratory experiments on redistribution in the United 
Kingdom and in Germany with existing survey data from the EES 2014, we show that 
various aspects of cosmopolitanism, most notably, orientations towards immigrants and 
European integration, are powerful predictors of the willingness to redistribute 
internationally. Importantly, our findings suggest that cosmopolitanism matters more for 
people’s willingness to redistribute internationally compared to conventional economic 
and political variables, such as political ideology or attitudes towards income inequality. 
This dovetails with evidence by Bechtel and colleagues (2014) regarding bailout support, 
and suggests that their findings for Germany might be applicable more generally. 
Our study does come with some limitations. It is impossible to assess causality in 
cross-sectional surveys like the EES, and while the great strength of experimental 
research lies in random assignment to treatments, the fact that cosmopolitanism cannot 
be randomly assigned limits our ability to make causal claims. That said, the fact that our 
findings regarding cosmopolitanism and international redistribution preferences are 
similar across data sources and methods used increases our overall confidence in their 
validity.  
Bearing these limitations in mind, our findings suggest that preferences for 
national and European redistribution are two different beasts that are not necessarily 
related to each other. Important predictors of national redistribution, like self-interest or 
left-right ideology, do not play a big role in explaining support for international 
redistribution within the EU. These findings corroborate the statement by Noël and 
Thérien (2002: 649) that ‘[p]ublic opinion on international redistribution is not a simple 
extension of public attitudes about domestic redistribution’.  
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Our findings inform current scholarly debates on the sovereign debt crisis in 
Europe (Copelovitch et al. 2016). The jury is still out on whether Europeans are ready to 
redistribute internationally. While Zürn (2016: 25) notes that ‘there is little sign of 
comprehensive transnational solidarity developing that would make it possible to shift 
redistributive policy in the sense of creating social rights to the global, or even European 
level’, Risse (2014) is more optimistic. He contends that the share of citizens who 
identify (also) as European is large enough, and their identification is strong enough, to 
provide public support for international redistribution (Risse 2014: 1208). Our results 
suggest that a considerable share of Europeans is indeed open towards international 
redistribution, even if this incurs some personal cost. Our evidence showing that 
cosmopolitans do not discriminate against recipients from other EU member states and 
are overall more generous, challenges the critique that cosmopolitanism is too superficial 
and detached from society to provide a basis for social solidarity. To the contrary, it 
suggests that cosmopolitans are at the forefront of international solidarity in the EU.  
Finally, our results speak to current policy debates in the EU. We show that 
support for redistribution within the EU is substantial, perhaps more so than the popular 
media leads us to believe. This is important information for policy makers. It renders 
some legitimacy to continuing efforts to financially assist member states in crisis. 
Moreover, the finding that cosmopolitanism rather than support for national 
redistribution motivates Europeans’ commitment to international solidarity has 
important implications for policy makers attempting to mobilize support for financial 
bailouts. Elites might not be able to frame policy programmes such as European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) in the same way than those at the national level. If general 
preferences for redistribution played a larger role, elites could emphasize the neediness of 
particular member states, and point out the vast economic inequalities throughout the 
Union. However, our results suggest that these strategies are likely to be less fruitful than 
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those aimed at downplaying national differences or appealing to collective European 
identity. 
 
 
                                                
i  A growing body of research challenges the role of self-interest for national 
redistribution as well. 
ii However, as any collective identity, European identity requires a common other, which 
is often defined in ethnic or cultural terms (Diez 2004; Kuhn 2015). 
iii Three participants were older than 35; removing them did not alter the results. 
iv No information about the exact member state was given.  
v For the exact wording of the instructions, see appendix (D).  
vi A principal axis factor analysis (promax oblique rotation) shows that these four items 
load on two distinct factors. The first factor relates city- and country-level concerns 
(Eigenvalue 2.56, respective factor loadings .79 and .85, remaining loadings <.4), while 
the second factor underlies concerns with people in Europe and humankind (Eigenvalue 
2.27, respective factor loadings .61 and .74, remaining loadings <.4). 
vii Many university students are financially supported by their parents and the state; it is 
therefore not sensible to measure their income. Alternatively, we assessed the effect of 
parental socio-economic background by adding the father’s educational level to the 
models. This had no significant effect in any of the models, and did not alter the results 
substantively. As it reduced the sample with 30 participants, we did not include it in the 
main models.  
viii Estimations with a dummy for member states that joined in 2004-2013 and a dummy 
for net contributor status did not change the effect of our independent variables. Due to 
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high collinearity they are not included in the final models. Missing values were treated by 
list-wise deletion. 
ix Ordered logistic random intercept models are estimated using Stata’s gllamm package. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1 
.  
Figure	 1:	 Effect	 of	 European	 recipient	 as	 cosmopolitanism	 (left)	 and	 immigration	 support	 (right)	
increase	
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Figure 2 
	
Figure	2:		Predicted	probability	of	support	for	transnational	redistribution	(1-4)	by	support	
for	immigration	
Source:	EES	2014,	based	upon	model	3	(table	E1).	Note:	Average	predicted	change	(from	minimum	to	maximum)	
over	the	four	categories	of	dependent	variable	is	.13.		
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Table 2. Total contributions to European recipient 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Cosmopolitanism Immigration European identity EU support 
Cosmopol. scale 38.80 (21.82)*    
Immigration  13.62* (6.08)   
European identity   74.69** (27.85)  
EU support    62.81** (26.88) 
Age 2.10 (3.55) 3.04 (3.50) -0.06 (3.60) 1.94 (4.08) 
Gender (1=male) -6.84 (33.91) 1.70 (33.23)       13.74 (35.08) 10.97 (33.62) 
Class -32.58 (18.91) -34.79 (18.30) -42.56 (19.26)* -30.48 (18.53) 
Left-right -6.67 (12.29) -2.28 (12.58) -3.17 (12.45) -5.42 (12.16) 
Left-right2 -6.30 (3.85) -6.59 (3.81) -5.04 (3.93) -4.88 (3.84) 
Inequality aversion -2.01 (6.99) -1.74 (6.76) -3.43 (7.30) -3.46 (6.83) 
Concern for others 34.48 (20.67) 25.93 (19.98) 30.34 (20.94) 22.95 (20.37) 
Constant 339.06** (116.57) 237.27* (116.00) 352.04** (115.85) 230.93 (126.37) 
N 178 182 171 179 
R-squared 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 
 
  
Source: own laboratory experiment. OLS regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (one-tailed). 
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Table 3. Multilevel ordered logistic model explaining support for financial help to other 
EU member states 
  Model 1 
Socio-structural factors   
  Age   0.00 (.00)* 
  Gender (1=male)   0.12 (.03)*** 
  Class (subjective, 1-10)   0.06 (.01)*** 
  Low educated (ref: middle)  -0.12 (.04)** 
  High educated (ref: middle)   0.22 (.03)*** 
Attitudes  
  Left-right (z)  -0.10 (.01)*** 
  Left-right squared (z)   0.01 (.01) 
  Support redistribution (z)   0.00 (.01) 
  Support immigration (z)   0.30 (.01)*** 
  Attachment to EU (z)   0.35 (.02)*** 
  EU membership support (z)   0.44 (.02)*** 
Country level  
  GDP per capita (2013)   0.01 (.00)*** 
  Eurozone member (0/1)  -0.50 (.04)** 
Constant cut1  -0.88 (.08)*** 
Constant cut2    0.64 (.08)*** 
Constant cut3   3.13 (.08)*** 
Level 2 variance (country)  0.08 (.01)*** 
Source: EES 2014. Multilevel ordered logistic model with random intercept at country level. Standard 
errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. n(respondents)=20,633; n(countries)=28. 
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Appendix A: Descriptive statistics 
 
Table A1. Descriptives of experimental data 
Variable N (subjects) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Age 201 23.77 4.62 19 52 
Gender (1=male) 203 .57 .50 0 1 
Class 191 2.96 .93 1 5 
Left-right (centered)  197 -1.16 1.76 -4.5 4.5 
Inequality aversion 199 7.34 2.70 0 10 
      Concern for others (z) 195 .09 .86 -2.49 1.34 
Cosmopolitanism scale (z) 195 .03 .78 -2.16 2.14 
Immigration support 200 6.43 3.01 0 10 
National/European identity 188 .88 .67 0 3 
EU membership support 197 1.64 .63 0 2 
Source: Own laboratory experiment, data collected in 4 locations in the UK and Germany in Spring 2013 
 
Table A2. Descriptives of European Election Study 2014 data 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Age 51.91 17.09 18 99 
Gender (1=male) 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Class 5.53 1.55 1 10 
Education 2.27 0.72 1 3 
Support for redistribution 6.12 2.89 0 10 
Support for immigration 4.54 3.08 0 10 
Left-right self-placement 5.08 2.61 0 10 
Attachment to Europe 2.91 0.92 1 4 
EU membership support 2.46 0.72 1 3 
Transnational solidarity in the EU 2.51 0.94 1 4 
Eurozone member 0.67 0.47 0 1 
GDP per capita 98.64 33.46 45 257 
Note: N (respondents) is 20,633, n(countries) is 28 for all variables (listwise deletion applied). 
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Appendix B: Operationalizations 
 
Table B1. Operationalization of variables in lab experiments and EES 2014 
 Lab experiments European Election Survey 
Dependent variable Amount of tokens given to 
anonymous, randomly matched 
recipient in another EU member 
state 
In times of crisis, it is desirable 
for [our country] to give 
financial help to another EU 
Member State facing severe 
economic and financial 
difficulties (1-4) 
Independent variables   
   Cosmopolitanism scale (Care for people in Europe+ Care for 
human kind) – (Care for people in 
city + Care for people in country) 
 
   Support for immigration Country is taking too many 
immigrants (0-10, reverse coded) 
Support for more restrictive 
immigration policy (0-10, 
reverse coded) 
   European identity Identify as national/European or both 
(1-4) 
Attachment to Europe (1-4) 
   EU membership support Country’s EU-membership 
good/bad/neither (1-3) 
Country’s EU-membership 
good/bad/neither (1-3) 
   
Control variables   
Age Age in years Age in years 
Gender Gender dummy (male=1) Gender dummy (male=1) 
Level of education 
 
Age when finished education: 
low (<16), middle (16-19), high 
(>19) 
Social class Subjective social class (1-5) Subjective social class (0-10) 
Ideology Left-right self-placement (0-10) Left-right self-placement (0-10) 
   
   Inequality aversion Income differences too large (0-10)  Support for redistribution of 
wealth (0-10) 
   Concern for others Care for people in city + Care for 
people in country 
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Appendix C: Robustness checks experiments 
 
Table C1. Treatment effects on contributions, interacted with class, ideology, inequality aversion and concern for others 
	 Model	0	 Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3	 Model	4	
		 No	interactions	 Class		 Ideology	 Inequality	aversion	 Concern	for	others	
Recipient	in	game	 	 	 	 	 	
			Local	 16.26	(8.21)*	 22.26 (28.54) 24.06 (11.11)* 23.09 (24.16) 16.16 (8.26) 
			European	 -8.07	(8.21)	 -27.39 (28.54) -7.36 (11.11) -20.88 (24.16) -7.93 (8.26) 
	 	 	 	   
Interactions	with	recipient	 	 	 	   
		L*Class	 	 -2.01 (9.18)    
		E*Class	 	 6.49 (9.18)  	 	
		L*Left-right	 	 	 0.77 (5.67)  	
		L*Left-right2	 	 	 -1.49 (1.93)  	
		E*Left-right	 	 	 -9.63 (5.67)  	
		E*Left-right2	 	 	 -2.71 (1.93)  	
		L*Inequality	aversion	 	 	 	 -0.93 (3.09)  
		E*Inequality	aversion	 	 	 	 1.74 (3.09)  
		L*Concern	for	others	 	 	 	  1.40 (9.84) 
		E*Concern	for	others	 	 	 	 	 -1.73 (9.84) 
	 	 	 	 	  
Control	variables	 	 	 	 	 	
		Age	 	 3.46	(3.51)	 3.46 (3.51) 3.46 (3.51) 3.46 (3.51) 3.46 (3.51) 
		Gender	(1=male)	 1.96	(33.50)	 1.96 (33.50) 1.96 (33.50) 1.96 (33.50) 1.96 (33.50) 
		Class	 -36.92	(18.31)*	 -38.42 (19.07)* -36.92 (18.32)* -36.92 (18.32)* -36.92 (18.32)* 
		Left-right	placement	 -4.15	(12.00)	 -4.15 (12.00) -1.20 (12.44) -4.15 (12.00) -4.15 (12.00) 
		Left-right2	 -4.51	(3.83)	 -4.51 (3.83) -3.11 (3.99) -4.51 (3.83) -4.51 (3.83) 
		Inequality	aversion	 -2.19	(6.82)	 -2.19 (6.82) -2.19 (6.82) -2.47 (7.05) -2.19 (6.82) 
		Concern	for	others	 30.06	(20.13)	 30.06 (20.13) 30.06 (20.13) 30.06 (20.13) 30.17 (20.92) 
Constant	 317.70	(105.08)**	 323.38 (113.53)** 316.11 (112.51)** 320.94 (113.19)** 318.94 (112.43)** 
N	(decisions/subjects)	 546/182	 546/182 546/182 546/182 546/182 
Source:	own	laboratory	experiment.	Panel	data	analysis	with	individual	fixed	effects.	Standard	errors	in	parentheses	***	p<0.001,	**	p<0.01,	*	p<0.05	(one-tailed).	   
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Table C2. Treatment effects on contributions, interacted with participant characteristics, 
controlled for location of experiment  
  Inequality  Concern for 
others 
Cosmopolit
anism 
Immigratio
n 
European 
identity 
EU 
support 
Oxford  -6.59 
(45.49) 
-9.98 
(45.03) 
-3.69 
(45.52) 
-3.24 
(44.90) 
11.20 
(48.15) 
-1.47 
(46.74) 
Edinburgh   96.19* 
(50.46) 
92.87 
(49.96) 
90.32 
(51.03) 
95.89 
(50.03) 
110.25* 
(52.42) 
89.18 
(51.59) 
Berlin   84.57* 
(47.40) 
97.96* 
(46.80) 
103.73* 
(47.73) 
89.53 
(46.71) 
86.60 
(49.31) 
87.50 
(46.69) 
  Age    2.80 
(3.61) 
  3.03 (3.59)   1.84 (3.64)   3.17 (3.59) 1.71 (3.69) 2.14 (4.40) 
  Gender 
(1=male) 
  -14.14 
(32.92) 
-7.16 
(32.41) 
-13.69 
(32.66) 
  -18.71 
(32.33) 
-20.23 
(34.71) 
-26.40 
(32.67) 
  Class   -33.68* 
(18.39) 
 -36.59* 
(17.89) 
 -41.99* 
(18.55) 
 -37.56* 
(18.00) 
-41.62* 
(19.33) 
-36.60* 
(18.10) 
Attitudes       
  Left-right 
placement 
  -0.47 
(11.60) 
-0.91 
(11.12) 
  2.59 
(11.08) 
  8.30 
(11.56) 
6.74 
(11.27) 
 6.71 
(11.10) 
  Left-right2   -2.64 
(3.67) 
-4.49 (3.78) -3.17 (3.65) -3.10 (3.64) -2.81 
(3.78) 
-2.23 
(3.70) 
  Inequality 
aversion 
 -4.24 
(6.82) 
     -3.63 
(6.63) 
  Concern for 
others 
   32.51 
(20.15) 
    
  
Cosmopolitanism 
    7.30 
(22.08) 
   
  Support for 
immigration 
     4.90 (6.10)   
  European 
identity  
    27.01 
(28.93) 
 
  EU membership 
support 
     6.07 
(27.51) 
Recipient in 
game 
      
   Local    22.17 
(23.56) 
  17.47* 
(8.30) 
17.53*(8.27
) 
  8.30 
(18.92) 
-1.97 
(14.01) 
 -58.50* 
(23.01) 
   European  -29.01 
(23.56) 
 -6.96 
(8.30) 
 -6.00 
(8.27) 
 -65.92*** 
(18.92) 
-31.94* 
(14.01) 
 -96.81*** 
(23.01) 
Interactions with 
recipient 
      
  L*Inequality 
aversion 
  -0.83 
(3.02) 
     
  E*Inequality 
aversion 
    2.72 
(3.02) 
     
  L*Concern for 
others 
   4.15 (9.84)     
  E*Concern for 
others 
   0.32 (9.84)     
  
L*Cosmopolitani
sm 
    8.15 
(10.49) 
   
  
E*Cosmopolitani
sm 
    22.00* 
(10.49) 
   
  L*Support for 
immigration 
   1.47 (2.71)   
  E*Support for 
immigration 
   9.17*** 
(2.71) 
  
  L*European     20.80   
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identity (12.75) 
  E*European 
identity 
    25.81* 
(12.75) 
 
  L*EU 
membership 
support 
       46.01*** 
(13.10) 
  E*EU 
membership 
support 
       
53.85***(
13.10) 
Constant 294.32* 
(127.34) 
274.08* 
(117.19) 
313.76** 
(121.63) 
243.05* 
(123.00) 
283.05*(1
23.89) 
278.60*
 (1
40.76) 
N 
(decisions/subjec
ts) 
552/184 549/183 540/180 555/185 519/173 546/182 
Source: own lab experiment. Panel data analysis, random effects estimation. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (1-tailed). 
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Appendix D: Wording of experimental instructions 
 
General instructions: 
Welcome to this experiment. This experiment is about how people make decisions. If you pay 
close attention to the instructions then you could make a significant amount of money. 
Feel free to ask the monitor questions as they arise. From now until the end of the session, 
unauthorized communication of any nature with other participants is prohibited. Please note 
that the consumption of food and beverages is not allowed during the experiment. 
This experiment consists of 4 modules and one questionnaire at the end. Instructions will be 
handed out at the beginning of each module. We ask that you plan on staying until the end of 
the session, which will last about 90 minutes. 
In this experiment you are going to be asked to take decisions that affect you and other 
people. Some will be in this city, but they may not be in this room now; some will be from 
other cities in the United Kingdom, and some will be from other member states of the 
European Union. 
At this point, some people may have already participated in this experiment, and other groups 
are participating in the same experiment these weeks. Your choices, and the choices by 
others, will be matched with the help of some colleagues at another university once the 
research is finished. You will be paid £6 in cash as a show up fee at the end of this session, 
and in three weeks time, at the end of this research, you will receive an email asking you to 
come to be paid in cash for the decisions that you and the people you have been matched with 
made. 
The same instructions are being given to other people in other countries. Everyone will get 
the same materials that you get, and is hearing the same thing you are, but in their own 
language. 
All of the decisions are similar, so please pay attention to these instructions. At the outset of 
each decision you will be given tokens. It will be important to keep in mind that 1000 tokens 
are worth £3.25 to you. We have taken care that the tokens are worth the same value in terms 
of what could be purchased with them in each participating country.  
Again, keep in mind that you are being matched with other people (some of whom are from 
around here, and others from other places in the UK or other European member states). Your 
decisions, and the decisions of the other participants, will affect how much you make. When 
the research is finished, our server will match the information about others’ choices in order 
to calculate each participant’s payments. This may take a few weeks, and that’s why you will 
receive your payoffs in three weeks time, but you will receive a £6 cash show up fee before 
you leave today.  
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Dictator game 
a) In this module you are going to make three independent decisions. 
b) Half of the participants will receive an Endowment of 1000 tokens (group A), and the 
other half will not (group B). 
c) Each participant who receives an Endowment (group A) will be randomly paired with 
another participant who has not (group B). You will not know the other person's identity, 
nor will they know yours. Nor will these identities be revealed after the session is 
completed. 
d) However, before the endowments are distributed and the pairing takes place, you may 
allocate the endowment between yourself and the other person as you wish if you were to 
receive this Endowment.  
e) Profits in this module will be calculated in the following way:  
i) Group A: Profits = Endowment – Amount Sent 
ii) Group B: Profits = Amount Received 
Decision 1 
Remember that you don’t know yet whether you are in Group A or in Group B. 
How many of the 1000 tokens do you send to the other participant knowing that he/she is 
participating in another location in the UK? 
How many of the 1000 tokens do you keep for yourself (remember that the sum of both 
amounts have to be equal to 1000 tokens)? 
 
Decision 2 
Remember that you don’t know yet whether you are in Group A or in Group B. 
How many of the 1000 tokens do you send to the other participant knowing that he/she might 
not be in this room, but is participating in this local area? 
How many of the 1000 tokens do you keep for yourself (remember that the sum of both 
amounts have to be equal to 1000 tokens)? 
 
Decision 3 
Remember that you don’t know yet whether you are in Group A or in Group B. 
How many of the 1000 tokens do you send to the other participant knowing that he/she is 
participating in another member state in the European Union? 
 10 
How many of the 1000 tokens do you keep for yourself (remember that the sum of both 
amounts have to be equal to 1000 tokens)? 
[NB: all participants were asked to make all three decisions; decisions were in a random 
order] 
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Appendix E: Additional results of cross-national survey analysis 
 
Table E1. Multilevel ordered logistic models explaining support for financial help to other EU 
countries 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Socio-structural 
factors 
            
  Age   0.00 
(.00)*** 
  0.00 
(.00)* 
  0.00 
(.00)*** 
  0.00 (.00)   0.00 
(.00)* 
  0.00 
(.00)* 
  Gender (1=male)   0.12 
(.03)*** 
  0.12 
(.03)*** 
  0.15 
(.03)*** 
  0.10 
(.03)*** 
  0.10 
(.03)*** 
  0.12 
(.03)*** 
  Class (subjective, 1-
10) 
  0.12 
(.01)*** 
  0.12 
(.01)*** 
  0.11 
(.01)*** 
  0.08 
(.01)*** 
  0.08 
(.01)*** 
  0.06 
(.01)*** 
  Low educated (ref: 
middle) 
 -0.28 
(.04)*** 
 -0.27 
(.04)*** 
 -0.23 
(.04)*** 
 -0.19 
(.04)** 
 -0.18 
(.04)*** 
 -0.12 
(.04)** 
  High educated (ref: 
middle) 
  0.44 
(.03)*** 
  0.41 
(.03)*** 
  0.40 
(.03)*** 
  0.33 
(.03)*** 
  0.29 
(.03)*** 
  0.22 
(.03)*** 
Attitudes       
  Left-right (z)  -0.09 
(.01)*** 
 -0.10 
(.01)*** 
 -0.06 
(.01)*** 
 -0.11 
(.01)*** 
 -0.13 
(.01)*** 
 -0.10 
(.01)*** 
  Left-right squared 
(z) 
  0.02 (.01)   0.02 
(.02)* 
  0.01 (.01)   0.01 (.01)   0.02 
(.01)* 
  0.01 (.01) 
  Support 
redistribution (z) 
  -0.03 
(.01)* 
     0.00 (.01) 
  Support immigration 
(z) 
   0.36 
(.01)*** 
    0.30 
(.01)*** 
  Attachment to EU 
(z) 
     0.54 
(.01)*** 
   0.35 
(.02)*** 
  EU membership 
support (z) 
      0.59 
(.01)*** 
  0.44 
(.02)*** 
Country level       
  GDP per capita 
(2013) 
  0.01 
(.00)*** 
  0.01 
(.00)*** 
  0.01 
(.00)*** 
  0.01 
(.00)** 
  0.01 
(.00)*** 
  0.01 
(.00)*** 
  Eurozone member 
(0/1) 
 -0.27 
(.03)* 
 -0.26 
(.03)* 
 -0.47 
(.03)*** 
 -0.31 
(.03)*** 
 -0.58 
(.03)** 
 -0.50 
(.04)** 
       
Constant cut1   0.29 (.07)   0.07 (.08)    -0.04 
(.07) 
 -0.42 
(.07)*** 
 -0.46 
(.08)*** 
 -0.88 
(.08)*** 
Constant cut2   1.67 
(.07)*** 
  1.45 
(.08)*** 
  1.36 
(.08)*** 
  1.03 
(.07)*** 
  1.02 
(.08)*** 
   0.64 
(.08)*** 
Constant cut3   3.97 
(.08)*** 
  3.74 
(.08)*** 
  3.71 
(.08)*** 
  3.42 
(.08)*** 
  3.43 
(.08)*** 
  3.13 
(.08)*** 
       
Level 2 variance 
(country) 
  0.10 
(.01)*** 
  0.14 
(.01)*** 
  0.14 
(.01)*** 
  0.13 
(.01)*** 
  0.10 
(.01)*** 
 0.08 
(.01)*** 
Observations 20,633 20,633 20,633 20,633 20,633 20,633 
Source: European Election Study 2014. Multilevel ordered logistic models with random intercept at country 
level. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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Table E2a. Ordered logistic regression models by country (Western Europe) 
 
BEL DNK GRC ESP FIN FRA IRL ITA LUX NLD AUT PRT SWE DEU UK 
Age 0.01** -0.01* 0.00 0.02*** -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02* 0.00 -0.01* 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Male 0.44*** 0.07 0.07 0.28* 0.34* 0.32* 0.39** 0.28 0.13 0.23 0.06 -0.15 0.24 0.15  -0.08 
 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.21) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) 
Class (1-
10) 0.04 0.08 -0.01 0.09 -0.07 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.09 -0.05 0.08 -0.05 0.13** 0.11 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Education 
(ref: mid)                
Low -0.45* 0.08 -0.12 -0.24 -0.43 -0.33 -0.55* 0.18 0.11 -0.43 -0.19 -0.08 -0.14 0.06 -0.11 
   (0.21) (0.36) (0.19) (0.17) (0.28) (0.23) (0.22) (0.21) (0.32) (0.26) (0.20) (0.19) (0.28) (0.15) (0.18) 
High  0.39** 0.22 0.30 0.74*** 0.15 0.55*** 0.47** -0.05 0.17 0.12 0.32 0.06 -0.17 0.47*** 0.21 
 
(0.14) (0.19) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.25) (0.15) (0.16) (0.24) (0.17) (0.13) (0.16) 
Left-right  -0.31*** -0.23** -0.07 -0.02 -0.08 -0.28*** -0.24* -0.05 -0.03 -0.28** -0.18* -0.00 -0.11 -0.33*** -0.05 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Left-right2 0.05 0.02 -0.07 0.02 0.28*** -0.07 -0.08 0.01 0.08 -0.12 0.14* 0.02 0.03 -0.08 -0.14* 
 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Support 
redistrib. 
-0.11 0.17* -0.05 -0.02 0.17 0.10 -0.13 0.04 0.15 0.08 0.22** -0.34*** 0.20* -0.05 0.16* 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) 
Support 
immig. 
0.35*** 0.48*** 0.17* 0.56*** 0.89*** 0.44*** 0.14 0.70*** 0.18 0.73*** 0.42*** -0.01 0.50*** 0.28*** 0.31*** 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.14) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) 
 
EU attach. 0.45*** 0.40*** 0.18* 0.20** 0.48*** 0.46*** 0.44*** 0.22* 0.74*** 0.55*** 0.44*** 0.20 0.47*** 0.59*** 0.33*** 
 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.15) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
EU 
member 0.33*** 0.51*** 0.27*** 0.29*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.34*** 0.24** 0.62*** 1.00*** 0.73*** 0.31*** 0.41*** 0.58*** 0.56*** 
 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.15) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
                Constant 
cut1 
-1.07** -2.17*** -0.95** 0.18 -2.30*** -0.79* -1.21** -0.73 -2.91*** -2.02*** -2.84*** -0.78* -3.55*** -1.03*** -2.03*** 
(0.36) (0.40) (0.35) (0.34) (0.39) (0.34) (0.38) (0.46) (0.63) (0.43) (0.39) (0.38) (0.41) (0.29) (0.34) 
Constant 
cut2 
0.73* -0.68 0.40 1.71*** -0.24 0.72* 0.18 0.95* -0.92 0.38 -1.19** 0.56 -1.98*** 0.72* -0.53 
(0.36) (0.39) (0.34) (0.34) (0.38) (0.34) (0.38) (0.46) (0.60) (0.42) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (0.29) (0.33) 
Constant 
cut3 
3.43*** 2.08*** 2.42*** 3.88*** 3.10*** 3.13*** 2.80*** 3.48*** 2.47*** 3.46*** 1.39*** 3.81*** 1.09** 3.42*** 2.19*** 
(0.38) (0.40) (0.36) (0.36) (0.40) (0.36) (0.39) (0.49) (0.61) (0.44) (0.38) (0.44) (0.38) (0.30) (0.34) 
                N 944 908 819 866 864 800 751 655 381 963 744 655 1,028 1,293 903 
Source:  European Election Study 2014. Ordered logistic regression models. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
                
Table E2b. Ordered logistic regression models by country (Eastern Europe) 
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 BGR CYP CZE EST HUN LVA LTU MLT POL ROU SVK SVN HRV 
 Age 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.01* 0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01* -0.00 -0.00 0.01** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 Male -0.44** 0.30 -0.12 0.36* 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.47 -0.17 0.10 -0.19 0.12 0.13 
 (0.17) (0.21) (0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.24) (0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) 
 Class (1-10) 0.04 0.08 0.17** 0.00 -0.00 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.22*** -0.06 0.11* -0.08 0.21*** 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Education 
(ref: mid) 
             
Low 0.53 0.10 -0.94** -0.71 -0.29 -0.67 -0.52 -0.21 0.12 -0.39 -0.16 0.10 0.13 
   (0.35) (0.30) (0.32) (0.37) (0.17) (0.40) (0.31) (0.30) (0.32) (0.25) (0.27) (0.22) (0.29) 
High  -0.04 -0.21 -0.19 0.29 0.26 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.25 0.03 0.18 0.31 -0.51** 
 (0.18) (0.25) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.33) (0.17) (0.19) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) 
Left-right  -0.17 -0.12 -0.13 -0.24** -0.25*** -0.13 -0.06 0.12 -0.10 0.06 0.12 -0.03 0.03 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.13) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Left-right2 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.35*** -0.04 0.10 0.18** 0.14 -0.13 0.06 0.07 -0.11 0.01 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.11) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Support 
redistrib. 
0.12* -0.07 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 -0.06 0.06 0.14* 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Support 
immig. 
-0.14 0.14 0.18** 0.01 0.28*** 0.08 0.12 0.38** 0.34*** 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.08 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
EU attach. 0.10 0.15 0.09 0.49*** 0.09 0.41*** 0.52*** 0.41** 0.28* 0.33*** 0.23** 0.37*** 0.13 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.16) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) 
EU member 0.57*** 0.19 0.47*** 0.54*** 0.38*** 0.37*** 0.35*** 0.28 0.43*** 0.25** 0.50*** 0.22* 0.26** 
(0.12) (0.11) (0.08) (0.12) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.17) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) 
              
Constant cut1 -0.45 -0.37 -0.91* -0.84* -0.47 -0.80 -1.39*** -0.16 -0.32 -1.53*** -0.39 -1.77*** -0.53 
(0.40) (0.54) (0.40) (0.43) (0.32) (0.42) (0.42) (0.72) (0.43) (0.42) (0.35) (0.42) (0.37) 
Constant cut2 0.83* 0.38 0.88* 0.78 1.01** 0.84* 0.03 1.09 1.50*** -0.26 1.24*** 0.04 0.83* 
(0.40) (0.54) (0.40) (0.43) (0.33) (0.42) (0.41) (0.72) (0.43) (0.41) (0.36) (0.41) (0.36) 
Constant cut3 2.75*** 1.75** 3.59*** 3.37*** 3.42*** 3.26*** 2.64*** 3.39*** 4.72*** 1.84*** 3.99*** 2.10*** 2.96*** 
(0.43) (0.55) (0.43) (0.45) (0.35) (0.44) (0.43) (0.75) (0.48) (0.42) (0.40) (0.43) (0.38) 
              
N 514 356 860 674 823 638 667 261 600 545 783 685 653 
Source: European Election Study 2014. Ordered logistic regression models. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
 
